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THE RESPECTIVE BURDENS OF PROOF
IN TITLE VII CASES:
PRICE WATERHOUSE v. HOPKINS
CONFUSES THE ISSUE
In August, 1982, a prestigious public accounting firm, Price
Waterhouse, ("PW")1 nominated 88 candidates for partnership. Only one
candidate was a woman. Her name is Ann Hopkins. This Note focuses
on her employment discrimination action against PW, which the United
States Supreme Court decided on May 1, 1989.
Price Waterhouse u Hopkins is a victory for Ms. Hopkins and millions
of employed women, and other minorities throughout the United States.
The opinion has several significant aspects. First, the case defines the
respective evidentiary burdens of a plaintiff-employee and defendant-
employer in a Title VIP suit, when the plaintiff-employee has shown that
the defendant-employer's employment action resulted from a considera-
tion of legitimate and illegitimate factors4 (i.e., "mixed motive case"). Sec-
ond, the express allocation of the burdens of proof resolved a conflict among
the various Courts of Appeals. Third, the Court failed to issue a majori-
ty opinion. This is significant in light of the current republican ad-
ministration and its influence on what is now a conservative Court.
This Note will delineate the background and facts which led to the
Court's decision in Price Waterhouse. The Note will discuss the opinions,
current ramifications and its future impact on discrimination decisions
of a more conservative Court.
' Price Waterhouse (Price) is an accounting firm which operates as a partnership, providing ser-
vices in tax, auditing, and management consulting to businesses and governmental agencies. See
Hopkins v. Price Waterhouse, 618 F. Supp. 1109, 1111 (D.C. 1985).
" Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 109 S Ct. 1775 (1989).
'Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 42 US.C. § 2000(e)-2000(h). Title VII provides, in per-
tinent part:
(a) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-
(1) To fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate
against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges
of employment, because of such individual's ... sex.
(Along with Title VII, Congress has enacted the following statutes to deal with discrimination: the
Civil War Reconstruction statutes, 42 U.S.C. § 1981; the Equal Pay Act of 1963, 29 U.SC. § 206;
the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.SC. § 621-634, and the Rehabilitation
Act of 1973, 29 U.SC. § 701-796. ZIER, CASES AND MATERL4S ON EmoYMENT DISCRIINATION 39
(1988)).
' "Legitimate" factors are factors not related to gender, and "illegitimate" factors are factors
related to gender. See generally Brodin, The Standard of Causation in the Mixed-Motive Title VII
Action: A Social Policy Perspective, 82 COLum. L. REv. 292 (1982). 1
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BACKGROUND
In Bradwell v. Illinois5 Justice Bradley stated, "the natural and prop-
er delicacy which belongs to the female sex evidently unfits it for many
of the occupations of civil life"'6 Justice Bradley was a supreme legal in-
tellect, but his perception of the capability of women proved to be totally
erroneous.
During the 1980's, women have comprised approximately 45% of the
nation's workforce! While most women earn their living in the "tradi-
tional" fields, more and more women are entering "nontraditional" fieldsO
For example, in 1987, approximately 7% of the nation's workforce was
engineers; this is impressive when compared to the 1971 figure of 0.8%.
Additionally, in 1971, only 5.7% of the nation's police officers and detec-
tives were women; that figured doubled to 11.4% in 1987. The largest
increase has occurred in the truck driving field; while less than 1% of
the nation's truck driver's in 1982 were women, today women comprise
11.2% of the field?
Despite their increasing numbers, women are continually subjected
to sexual discrimination at work. As Congresswoman Mary Rose Oakar
notes, "[despite legislative attempts], women continue to earn a
significantly lower percentage of wages [than men]... In terms of an-
nual earnings, women's wages [are only]... 64.3 percent of men's."10
Additionally, sexual discrimination occurring today will impact the
workplace in the future. Our current ideals and values influence our future
attitudes. As Congresswoman Claudine Schneider notes: "[d]iscrimina-
tion now will affect us years into the future-in the next decade, seven
out of ten new workers will be women."'" Statistics support Con-
gresswoman Schneider's statements. The results of a study conducted
by the Congressional Task Force on Women, Minorities, and the Handi-
capped in Science and Technology indicate that in the year 2000, approx-
5 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130 (1873).
6 Id. at 141 (Bradley, J., concurring).
Stevens, No One is Expendable, 69 NAT'L Bus. WoMAN, Aug./Sept., 1988, at 19.
' Where Few Women Have Gone Before, 69 NAT'L Bus. WOMAN, Aug./Sept., 1988, at 20. See also
Taub, Keeping Women in Their Place: Stereotyping per se as a Form of Employment Discrimination,
21 B.C.L. REV. 345 (1980). (in 1987, 98% of the nation's secretaries were women, 93% of the nation's
registered nurses were women, and 72% of the nation's teachers were women).
' All statistics represent survey results of U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics as appearing in Na-
tional Business Woman, supra note 8.
Oakar, Why We Need Pay Equity Reforms, 69 NAT'L Bus. WOMAN, Feb.fMar., 1988, at 15. For
an enlightening discussion on sexual discrimination as it relates to employee pension programs
as well as insurance, see Benston, The Economics of Gender Discrimination in Employee Fringe
Benefits: Manhart Revisited, 49 U. Cm. L. REv. 489 (1982).
"Schneider, Applause for BPW's Supporting Role in Enacting the Civil Rights Restoration Act,
69 NAT'L Bus. WoMAN, Apr./May, 1988, at 28.
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imately 65 percent of new entrants into the nation's labor force will be
women.1 2 In view of the long term effects of sexual discrimination, cases
such as Price Waterhouse set the mode for the future.
FACTs
The plaintiffs, Ann B. Hopkins, career with PW's Office of Govern-
ment Services (OGS) was progressing quite well.3 As a senior manager,
she played a key role in winning multi-million dollar contracts with the
Farmers Home Administration 4 and the State Department.- 5 It is
estimated that these two contracts brought the firm $34-44 million in
revenues. The firm's senior partner characterized the contract with the
State Department as a "leading credential" that brought the firm
business with other federal agencies.' 6 As a result of her efforts, Ms.
Hopkins earned a reputation as a highly competent leader who demanded
a great deal of herself and her support.'
When she was proposed as a partnership candidate in August, 1982,
her record for successfully securing major contracts was unmatched by
any of the other 87 partnership candidates. Despite her performance,
women partners were not commonplace at PW. In fact, at OGS, all part-
ners were men; even more astonishing, only seven out of 662 PW part-
ners were women.8
Although the OGS partners unanimously endorsed her for partner-
ship, other partners were not so eager to select a female peer. The evalua-
tions they submitted to the Admissions Committee, and their statements
at trial, included the following comments: [she lacks] "interpersonal
skills"; [she needs] "a course at charm school"; "she may have overcom-
pensated for being a woman"; [concerns over her use of profanity arose]
"because she is a lady using foul language"; "several partners [regard
her profane language] as one of the negatives"; and [she is] "macho."' 9
The most offensive comment, however, came from a partner who advised
Ms. Hopkins to "walk more femininely, dress more femininely, wear make-
up, have her hair styled, and wear jewelry"' 20
12 No One is Expendable supra note 7, at 19.
"' In 1982, Ms. Hopkins worked for OG& OGS specialized in designing and implementing con-
sulting and managefkient projects for government offices. Hopkins v. Price Waterhouse, 618 F. Supp.
1109, 1112 (D.C.D.C. 1985).
" Hopkins v. Price Waterhouse, 825 F.2d 458, 462 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
1" Hopkins, 618 F. Supp. at 1112.
1' Hopkins, 825 F.2d at 462.
1 Hopkins, 618 F. Supp. at 1112-13.
" Id. at 1112.
"8 Hopkins, 825 F.2d at 463, (citing various portions of the trial court transcript and plaintiff's
and defendant's exhibits).
20 Hopkins, 618 F. Supp. at 1117.
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Subsequently, Ms. Hopkins was denied partnership in 1982. The Ad-
missions Committee recommended that her candidacy be held for a year
and resubmitted at that time?' However, the following year, partners in
the OGS refused to repropose her?2
When she was not reproposed for partnership consideration, Ms.
Hopkins sued PW in the United States District Court for the District
of Columbia. She alleged a violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 196423 She contended that the firm's partnership decision making pro-
cess was tainted by sex discrimination?4
The District Court held for Ms. Hopkins on the liability issue. The
court found that she had sufficiently demonstrated that her gender was
a factor in PW's decision? 5 The court ruled that once a plaintiff
demonstrates the presence of discriminatory animus, the plaintiff is en-
titled to equitable relief, unless the employer can show, by clear and con-
vincing evidence, that the employment decision would have been the same
without the discrimination? 6 The court found that PW had failed to meet
this standard?7
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed
this portion of the District court's decision?' The Court of Appeals held
that in a Title VII action, once a plaintiff has shown that discriminatory
animus played a significant role in the contested employment decision,
the burden shifts to the employer to show by clear and convincing evidence
that the discriminatory factor was not determinative?9 If the employer
satisfies this burden, there is no liability?
"Hopkins, 825 F.2d at 463.
Id.
42 USC. § 2000(e)-2000(h).
Hopkins, 825 F.2d at 468.
Hopkins, 618 F. Supp. at 1120.
16 Id. The District Court stated: "once a plaintiff proves that sex discrimination played a role
in an employment decision, the plaintiff is entitled to relief unless the employer has demonstrated
by clear and convincing evidence that the decision would have been the same absent discrimina-
tion.' Id. (citing with approval Williams v. Boorstin, 663 F.2d 109, 117 (D.C. Cir. 1980), cert denied,
451 U.S 985 (1981); Day v. Mathews, 530 F.2d 1083, 1085-86 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
I7 d.
Hopkins, 825 F.2d at 473. (The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded the District court's
decision as to damages. Id. at 473.)
29 Id at 471 (citing with approval Toney v. Block, 705 F.2d 1364, 1366 (D.C. Cir. 1983)).
In Toney, the D.C. Circuit restated the doctrine it earlier espoused in Day v. Matthews, 530 F.2d
1083 (D.C. Cir. 1976): once discrimination is established, the burden shifts to the employer to show,
by "clear and convincing evidence that the discrimination was not the effective cause of the adverse
employment decision. Thney v. Block, 705 F.2d at 1366.
"o Hopkins, 825 F.2d at 470-71. (Compared with the District court, which ruled that employer
who proved this would merely avoid equitable relief.) Hopkins, 619 F. Supp. at 1120.
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When the Court of Appeals decided Ms. Hopkins' case, the courts of
appeals were in conflict over the parties' burdens of proof. The First, Sec-
ond, Sixth, and Eleventh Circuits held that once the plaintiff
demonstrated that discriminatory animus was a motivating factor in the
employer's decision, the employer escaped liability by proving that it
would have made the same decision in the absence of discrimination!'
However, these courts, unlike the D.C. Circuit, did not require clear and
convincing evidence. (The D.C. Circuit (in Price Waterhouse) and the Ninth
Circuit.)"2 A different standard existed in the Third, Fourth, Fifth, and
Seventh Circuits, where the plaintiff was required to show that "but for"
discriminatory animus, the decision would have been in her favor!'
In Bibbs v. Blocky the Eighth Circuit, sitting en banc, stated an en-
tirely different standard. In Bibbs, the court stated that once the plain-
tiff established a Title VII violation, the burden of production and per-
suasion shifted to the defendant!' However, under Bibbs, the defendant
could overcome this burden by a mere preponderance of the evidence 6
"l Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 109 S Ct. at 1784 n.2; see also eg, Blalock v. Metal Trades,
775 F.2d 703 (6th Cir.1985) (once employee demonstrated that religious discrimination was motivating
factor in discharge, employer must show that, even absent the discrimination, the employee still
would have been discharged); Fields v. Clark, 817 F.2d 931 (1st Cir. 1987) (when plaintiff proves
"by direct evidence" that sexual discrimination was a "motivating factor" in employment decision,
employer must show, by a preponderance of evidence, that decision would have been the same ab-
sent the discrimination); Berl v. Westchester County, 849 F.2d 712 (2d Cir 1988) (under "dual motiva-
tion/same decision" test, plaintiff has initial burden of proving that discriminatory motive played
"substantial part" in employer's decision; burden then shifts to employer to show it would have
made same decision in absence of discriminatory conduct); Bell v. Birmingham Linen Service, 715
F.2d 1552 (11th Cir. 1983), cert denied, 467 U.S 1204 (1984) (where employee presented direct evidence
of sexual discrimination, employer must show that sexual bias "had no relation whatsoever to the
employment decision").
" Price Waterhouse, 109 S Ct. at 1784 n.2; see alscj eg, Bellissimo v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp.,
764 F.2d 175, 179 n.1 (3d Cir. 1985), cert denied, 475 U.S 1035 (1986) ("but for" test requires plain-
tiff prove that discriminatory reason was a determinative factor in employment decision); Ross v.
Communications Satellite Corp., 759 F.2d 355 (4th Cir. 1985) (in suit alleging employer retaliation,
employee may disprove legitimate reason for employer adverse action by proving that "the adverse
action would not have occurred 'but for' the protected conduct"); Peters v. City of Shreveport, 818
F.2d 1148 (5th Cir. 1987), cert. dismissed, 108 S Ct. 1101 (1988) ("but for" causation standard ap-
plies to both Title VII and Equal Pay Act Claims); McQuillen v. Wisconsin Educ. Ass'n Council,
830 F.2d 659 (7th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 1068 (1988) (under "but for" standard, plaintiff
must show discriminatory motive was a "determining factor" in the challenged decision).
"Price Waterhouse, 109 S Ct. at 1784 n.2; see also eg, Bellissimo v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp.,
764 F.2d 175; Ross v. Communications Satellite Corp., 759 F.2d 355; Peters v. City of Shreveport,
818 F.2d 1148; McQuillen v. Wisconsin Educ. Ass'n Council, 830 F.2d 659.
778 F.2d 1318 (8th Cir. 1985) (en banc). In Bibbs, plaintiff brought suit alleging he was denied
a promotion because of his race. The Bibbs court found that plaintiff established a violation of Title
VII. Id. at 1319. As such, the burden of production and persuasion shifted to the defendant to show
that the proven discrimination did not cause the employment decision. Id. at 1324 (citing with ap-
proval King v. Trans-World Airlines, Inc., 738 F.2d 255, 259 (8th Cir. 1984)).
" Id. at 1324 (citing with approval King v. Trans-World Airlines, Inc., 738 F.2d 255, 259).
" Id. at 1325.
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In an effort to resolve this conflict, the Supreme Court granted cer-
tiorari in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins'".
Prior to Price Waterhouse, the Supreme Court decided numerous Ti-
tle VII cases. The most important of these were McDonnell Douglas Cor-
poration v. Green s and Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Bur-
dine3'
In McDonnell Douglas, the Court stated that in a disparate treatment
case, when an adverse employment action is taken, the plaintiff carries
the initial burden of proof of establishing a prima facie case of discrimina-
tion4 The burden then shifts to the employer to "articulate some
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the employee's rejection.'41
37 108 S Ct. 1106 (1988).
411 U.S 792 (1973). In McDonnell Douglas, plaintiff, a black man hired by defendant as a
mechanic, brought suit alleging a violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Plaintiff
asserted that his discharge from employment as well as defendant's general hiring practices were
racially motivated. The precise issue presented was "the order and allocation of proof in a private,
non-class action challenging employment discrimination " Id. at 800. A unanimous Court, per Justice
Powell, held that Title VII plaintiffs carry the "initial burden" of establishing "a prima facie case
of racial discrimination." Id. at 801. A plaintiff does this by establishing: "(i) that he belongs to
a racial minority; (ii) that he applied and was qualified for a job for which the employer was seeking
applicants' (iii) that, despite his qualifications, he was rejected; and (iv) that, after his rejection,
the position remained open and the employer continued to seek applicants from persons of [plain-
tiffs] qualifications.' Id. at 802. If the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the burden shifts
to the defendant-employer to "articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the employer's
rejection." Id. at 803. If the defendant does this, the plaintiff is afforded a fair opportunity to
demonstrate that the defendant's "reason" was in fact "pretext.' Id. at 804.
3 450 U.S 248 (1981). In Burdine, plaintiff, a female former employee, brought suit against her
former employer alleging that she was denied a promotion and subsequently terminated because
of her sex. Justice Powell again authored a unanimous opinion, in which the Court embraced the
doctrine it had earlier espoused in McDonnell Dougla4 discussed supra note 38. In Burdine, the
Court more clearly defined the "burden" which "shifts" to the employer after the plaintiff has pro-
ved a prima facie case of discrimination. The Court stated that the Title VII plaintiff's prima facie
case is the equivalent of showing "an infuence of discrimination." Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254. Thus,
the burden shifting to the defendant-employer "is to rebut the presumption of discrimination." Id.
at 254; see infra note 45. The Court stated succinctly and unequivocally that the "ultimate burden
of persuasion" remains with the plaintiff "at all times." Burdine, 450 U.S, at 253.
o McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S at 802.
" Id. "Disparate treatment" should be distinguished from "disparate impact." "Disparate treat-
ment" means that the "employer simply treats some people less favorably than others because of
their race, color, religion, sex, or natural origin" International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States,
431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977). "Disparate impact" involves employer practices which are facially
neutral but "fall more harsh on one group than another and cannot be justified by business necessi-
ty.' Id. at 336 n.15.
Prior to the Court's recent decision in Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 109 S Ct. 2115 (1989),
there were different evidentiary burdens placed upon the employer depending upon whether the
case involved disparate treatment or disparate impact. In disparate treatment cases, proof of
discriminatory motive by the plaintiff was critical. See Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing
Dev. Corp., 429 U.S 252 (1977). For this reason, the burden of persuasion remained with the plain-
tiff at all times. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253 (see supra note 39). Conversely, in disparate impact cases,
proof of discriminatory motive was not required. Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 336 n.15 (citing Griggs v. 6
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In Burdine, the Court clarified the "intermediate evidentiary
burdens" it introduced in McDonnell Douglas4 In Burdine, the Court
stated that the ultimate burden of persuasion remains with the plaintiff
at all times.3 The plaintiffs establishment of a prima facie case creates
a rebuttable presumption that the employer unlawfully discriminated
against the employe2 The defendant may rebut this presumption by pro-
ducing evidence that the employee was rejected for a legitimate/non-
discriminatory reason.4
With McDonnell Douglas and Burdine as its primary guides, the Court
set out to decide Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins.
THE DECISION
The Court could not reach a majority opinion in Price Waterhouse.'s
Justice Brennan's plurality opinion focused on the following areas:
A. Causation - Whether the burden of persuasion shifts to
the employer in a mixed-motive case;47
Duke Power Co., 401 U.S 424, 430-32 (1971)). Rather, the plaintiff was attempting to prove that
an employment practice had an adverse effect on a class of employees. Atonio, 109 & Ct. at 2131
(Stevens, J., dissenting). Thus, after the plaintiff established sufficient proof of discriminatory im-
pact, the burden of persuasion shifted to the employer. See id., 109 S. Ct. at 2130 n.14 (Stevens,
J., dissenting). After Atonio, in relation to the evidentiary burdens, there is no difference between
disparate treatment and disparate impact cases. In Atonio, the Court abandoned earlier precedent
and held that, in disparate impact cases, the "burden of persuasion ... remains [at all times] with
the ... plaintiff." Id. at 2126.
41 Burdine, 450 U.S at 253.
43 Id.
" Id. at 254.
" Id. In Burdine, the Court explained the manner in which the defendant may produce evidence
sufficient to rebut the presumption accordingly: "The burden that shifts to the defendant, therefore,
is to rebut the presumption of discrimination by producing evidence that the plaintiff was rejected,
or someone else was preferred, for a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason. The defendant need not
persuade the court that it was actually motivated by the proffered reasons. [citation omitted] It is
sufficient if the defendant's evidence raises a genuine issue of fact as to whether it discriminated
against the plaintiff. 'Tb accomplish this, the defendant must clearly set forth, through the introduction
of admissible evidence, the reasons for the plaintiff's rejection. The explanation provided must be
legally sufficient to justify a judgment for the defendant." Burdine, 450 U.S at 254-55. If the defend-
ant carries this burden, the plaintiff is then given the opportunity to prove, by a preponderance
of the evidence, that the "legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason" offered by the defendant were not
actually "true reasons." Id. at 253 (citing with approval McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411
U.S. at 804). (See infra note 98).
" Price Waterhouse, 109 S. Ct. at 1780. Justice Brennan announced the judgment of the Court;
Justice Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens joined in Justice Brennan's plurality opinion. Justices
White and O'Connor each concurred separately. Justice Kennedy wrote a dissenting opinion, in
which he was joined by Justice Scalia and Chief Justice Renhquist.
"' See id at 1784.
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B. Evidence - Whether the employer must present "objective
evidence" to rebut the plaintiffs case; 4 and
C. Level of persuasion- Whether the employer must prove by
"clear and convincing evidence" or "by a preponderance of
the evidence" that the employment decision would have been
the same, absent the discriminatory animus.P9
A. Causation. This issue was the focal point of tension between the par-
ties and the Court Justices.
PW argued that a Title VII violation occurs only when discriminatory
animus is a "decisive consideration" in the employer's decision-making
process.50 Specifically, it was PW's position that the words "because of"
which appear in Title VII, are the equivalent "colloquial shorthand" for
the expression "but-for causation."' Under PW's theory, it is not enough
for the plaintiff to prove that discriminatory animus "played a part" in
the employer's decision; the plaintiff must prove that if the employer had
not discriminated, the decision would have been different.5
2
The plaintiffs' argument was radically different. She contended that
an employer violates Title VII by merely allowing discriminatory animus
to "play any part" in the employment decision.53 Under this theory, once
a plaintiff has met this initial burden, the employer cannot avoid liabili-
ty?4 That is, the employer may present proof that it would have made
the same decision absent the discriminatory animus; however, this will
only serve to limit equitable relief.5P
The plurality refused to embrace either position.5 The plurality in-
itially noted that Title VII strikes a balance between employee rights
(prohibiting discriminatory animus), and employer prerogatives (permit-
ting consideration of other qualities and characteristics).5' It is this
"See id. at 1789-92.
"See id. at 1792-93.
so Id. at 1784.
-1 Id. at 1785. The plurality describes a but-for cause as follows: "[i n determining whether a
particular factor was a but-for cause of a given event, we begin by assuming that that factor was
present at the time of the event, and then ask whether, even if that factor had been absent, the
event nevertheless would have transpired in the same way." Id.
52 Id. at 1784.
5Id. Ms. Hopkins argued that an employer violates Title VII whenever it allows race, gender,
religion or natural origin to influence an employment decision in any way.
5Id.
11 Id. at 1783. Ms. Hopkins argued, in essence, the holding of the District Court, which was later
modified by the Court of Appeals.
"Id. at 1784. The plurality remarked that, "the truth lies somewhere in between.'
"Id. at 1784-85. The plurality articulated the statute's balancing of interests as follows: "In
passing Title VII, Congress made the simple but momentous announcement that sex, race, religion,
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8
Akron Law Review, Vol. 23 [1990], Iss. 2, Art. 9
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol23/iss2/9
BURDENS OF PROOF IN TITLE VII CASES
balance of rights which dictates the respective burdens of proof of each
party.5
Specifically, Title VII prohibits an employer from considering gender,
race, natural origin, or religion when making an employment decision,
while permitting the employer to take adverse action for other reasons.
As such, once a Title VII plaintiff shows that discriminatory animus
played a "motivating part" in an employment decision, the employer may
avoid liability only by proving that it would have made the same deci-
sion in the absence of the discriminatory animus °
Under the plurality's approach, the plaintiff is persuading the fact-
finder of one thing (discriminatory animus or "illegitimate factors"), while
the employer is persuading it of another ("legitimate factors"),6' Therefore,
the burden of persuasion does not actually "shift" from the plaintiff to
the employer on the causation issue 2 Rather, since each is proving
something entirely different, the employer's burden is more properly
characterized as an "affirmative defense""
Justice O'Connor disagreed with this analysis, as did the dissenting
Justices. Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion suggests that when the
plaintiff demonstrates, by direct evidence, that discriminatory animus was
a "substantial factor" in an adverse employment decision, the burden
of persuasion shifts to the employer to prove that "it is more likely than
not that the decision would have been the same absent the considera-
tion of the illegitimate factor "'6 5
and national origin are not relevant to the selection, evaluation, or compensation of employees. Yet,
the statute does not purport to limit the other qualities and characteristics that employers may
take into account in making employment decisions. The converse, therefore, of "for cause" legisla-
tion, Title VII eliminates certain bases for distinguishing among employees while otherwise pre-
serving employers' freedom of choice.' Id.
" Id. at 1787-88.
9 Id. at 1787. For an overview of Title VII, see generally 15 AM. JuR. 2D Civil Rights §§ 290-449
(1976).
Price Waterhouse, 109 S Ct. at 1787-88.
Id. at 1788.
6' Id. In Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 109 S. Ct. 2115, the Court reaffirmed this concept,
stating that the burden of persuasion remains with the plaintiff at all times. See Atonio, 109 S.Ct.
at 2126.
" Price Waterhouse, 109 S Ct. at 1788. (citing NLRB v. Transportation Management Corp., 462
U.S. 393, 400 (1983)). "[W]e hold that the plaintiff retains the burden of persuasion on the issue
whether gender played a part in the employment decision, the situation before us is not the one
of "shifting burdens" that we addressed in Burdine. Instead, the employer's burden is most ap-
propriately deemed an affirmative defense: the plaintiff must persuade the factfinder on one point,
and then the employer, it if wishes to prevail, must persuade it on another.' Id. (emphasis added).
"Id. at 1803 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
"Id. at 1804.
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The standard announced by the dissent is considerably more demand-
ing of the Title VII plaintiff. Under the dissent's framework, the burden
of persuasion remains with the plaintiff at all times; the plaintiff must
prove that the employment decision was made "because of" sex 6 The
plaintiff failed to meet this standard because she did not prove that the
partnership decision would have been different if Price had not
discriminated!7 Thus, the dissent would have remanded with judgment
entered in favor of PW s
B. Evidence. After determining the respective burdens of proof for each
party on the issue of causation, the plurality focused attention on the
type of evidence each party must present to satisfy those burdens! 9
The plurality stated that in a mixed-motive case, the Title VII plain-
tiff must show "that the employer actually relied on her gender in mak-
ing its decision."70 With respect to the specific facts in the case at bar,
the plaintiff proved that: 1) PW invited partners to submit comments,
2) some comments were based upon sexual bias, 3) these comments were
relevant to the Admission Committee's decision, and 4) PW did not
disclaim reliance on the sexually biased statements!1 As a result, the
plurality held that Ms. Hopkins had sufficiently met her burden of proof7
However, the plurality refused to elaborate any further, stating, "we
refrain from deciding here which specific facts, 'standing alone; would
or would not establish a plaintiffs case, since such a decision is un-
necessary in this case.' 73
As to the employer's proof, the plurality held that the employer must
prove that a legitimate reason, standing alone, would have induced the
same result?4 In order to achieve this, the employer must present "objec-
" Id. at 1814 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
" Id. The dissent based this conclusion upon the District Court's finding that Ms. Hopkins had
not proven "that she would have been elected to partnership if the Policy Board's decision had not
been tainted by sexually based evaluations." Id. (citing the District Court's decision, Hopkins, 618
F. Supp. at 1120).
8Id.
69 Id. at 1789-90.
Id. at 1791. Regarding the plaintiff's evidence of gender discrimination in the form of
"stereotyped remarks" of PW's partners, the plurality stated that these statements, in and of
themselves, would not "inevitably prove that gender played a part in a particular employment deci-
sion." However, the stereotyped remarks could serve as evidence indicating that gender played such
a part. Id.
71 Id. Price Waterhouse did suggest that this was a case of mere "discrimination in the air." Id.
However, the plurality agreed with Ms. Hopkins, who argued that this was a case of "discrimina-
tion brought to the ground and visited upon" an employee. Id (quoting Brief for Respondent at 30).
72 Id.
73 Id.
7' Id.
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tive evidence" as to its decision in the absence of discrimination 75
Justice White concurred with the plurality, but he disagreed as to
this "objective evidence" standard76 Justice White stated that, "there is
no special requirement that the employer carry its burden by objective
evidence!' Justice White suggests that, in order to succeed, the employer
need only "credibly testifly] that the action would have been taken for
the legitimate reasons alone' " '
C. Level of Persuasion. The lower courts ruled that once the plaintiff shows
that discriminatory animus played a part in the employer's decision, the
employer must prove by clear and convincing evidence that it would have
made the same decision, absent the discrimination 79
The plurality disagreed, holding that, where conventional relief is
sought, clear and convincing proof is seen only in rare instances, such
as in an action for defamation8 As such, conventional rules do not re-
quire an elevated standard of proof for an employer in the present case?'
Thus, the "better rule" is that the employer must make a showing only
by a preponderance of the evidence 2 With this standard, both Justices
White83 and O'Connor s4 concurred.
The plurality concluded that when a Title VII plaintiff proves that
discriminatory animus (namely, gender) played a "motivating part" in
the employer's decision, the employer may avoid liability only by proving
" Id. Along with the "objective evidence" requirement, the plurality additionally stated that
an employer may not satisfy its evidentiary burden "by merely showing that at the time of the deci-
sion it was motivated only in part by a legitimate reason" Id. (emphasis added).
"' Id. at 1796 (White, J., concurring).
7 Id. Justice White stated:
"In my view.., there is no special requirement that the employer carry its burden
by objective evidence. In a mixed motive case, where the legitimate motive found would
have been ample grounds for the action taken, and the employer credibly testifies that
the action would have been taken for the legitimate reasons alone, this should be ample
proof."
Id.
7 sId. The plurality remarked that Justice White's suggested evidentiary standard "is baffling."
Id. at 1791 n.14.
Hopkins, 825 F.2d at 471; Hopkins, 618 F. Supp. at 1120.
Price Waterhouse, 109 S, Ct. at 1792 (citing Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.SL 323, 342 (1974)).
(In Gertz, the Court restated the New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S, 254, standard that public
officials and public figures may recover for injury to their reputation only by showing by clear and
convincing evidence that they were injured by defamatory falsehoods. Gertz, 418 U.S at 342).
"' Price Waterhouse, 109 S Ct. at 1792.
82 Id.
" Id. at 1795-96 (White, J., concurring) (citing Mt. Healthy City School (Dist.) Bd. of Educ. v.
Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977) (once plaintiff shows constitutionally protected speech was "motivating
factor" in adverse treatment, employer must show by a preponderance of the evidence that decision
would have been the same in the absence of the protected conduct.Mt. Healthy, 429 U.S at 287.
" Price Waterhouse, 109 S Ct. at 1796.
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by a preponderance of the evidence that it would have made the same
decision in the absence of the discriminatory animus.!s Ms. Hopkins had
proved that her gender played a motivating part in PW's partnership deci-
sion.86 However, the Court of Appeals did not decide if PW had met its
burden by a preponderance of the evidence.87 Therefore, the Court reversed
the Court of Appeals judgment against Price on liability and remanded
the case to the Court of Appeals.8 s
ANALYSIS OF THE OPINIONS
The Plurality
The plurality opinion has two flaws. First, it appears inconsistent with
several of the Court's earlier Title VII decisions. Second, it is confusing,
and the lower federal courts - which were already in "disarray" 9 in this
legal area - will undoubtedly have trouble applying it.
1. Inconsistency with earlier Title VII cases
The plurality states that the PW decision is not traversing upon "new
ground."9 Rather, it is consistent with the court's earlier Title VII cases
and thus, "treads [a] well-worn path."91 This does not appear to be so.
The dissent states that the plurality's "path may be well-worn, but
it is in the wrong forest."92 The dissent's statement was caused by the
plurality's apparent alteration of a standard first developed in McDon-
nell Douglas and then fine-tuned in International Brotherhood of
Teamsters u United States'3 and Burdine.8 The dissent stresses the necessi-
ty to more closely adhere to the evidentiary framework set forth in those
earlier Title VII cases?5
85 Id. at 1795. The plurality stated: "We hold that when a plaintiff in a Title VII case proves
that her gender played a motivating part in an employment decision, the defendant may avoid a
finding of liability only by proving by a preponderance of the evidence that it would have made
the same decision even it if had not taken the plaintiffs gender into account.' Id.
86 Id.
87 Id. As noted earlier, supra note 29, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit followed its
earlier precedent (Toney v. Block, 705 F.2d 1364), and held that the employer must show by "clear
and convincing evidence" that discrimination did not effect the employment decision. Hopkins, 825
F.2d at 471. (citation omitted).
88 Id.
88 Price Waterhouse, 109 S, Ct. at 1784 n.2.
"Id. at 1789.
9' Id. at 1790.
Id. at 1811 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
93 431 U.S. 324 (1978). In Teamsters, the Court described the rationale for McDonnell Douglas's
four elements (see infra note 124) of a prima facie case. 431 U.S. at 358 n.44.
"Price Waterhouse, 109 S Ct. at 1806 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
95 Id.
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In McDonnell Douglas and Burdine,7 the Court stated that the plain-
tiff must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that circumstances
exist which give rise to an inference of unlawful discrimination; this
creates a rebuttable presumption of discrimination. The employer may
rebut this presumption by producing evidence (i.e., articulating some
legitimate reason) that the decision was made for a legitimate reasonY
The standard the plurality announces in Price Waterhouse is seem-
ingly different. The plurality justifies this different standard by classi-
fying Price Waterhouse as a "mixed-motive" case.?
The plurality states that, similar to Burdine, under Price Waterhouse,
the burden of persuasion does not shift, but is more similar to an affir-
mative defense. However, the glaring difference between Burdine and
Price Waterhouse lies in the nature of the evidentiary burden placed upon
the employer.
In Burdine, the Court stated that the employer satisfies its burden
if the evidence it presents raises "an issue of fact as to whether it
discriminated against the [employee].' '101 In order to accomplish this, the
employer need only explain "what [it] has done"'1° by articulating some
lawful reasons for its actions.'0 3
In Burdine, the Court concluded that the Court of Appeals had erred
because it "placed on the [employer] the burden of persuading the court
that it had convincing, objective reasons" for its decision.4 The Court
reversed the Court of Appeals because this standard required the employer
to prove more than was necessary.0 5 Thus, under Burdine, the employer's
burden can be characterized as "minimal" ' °
" 411 U.S at 802.
97 450 U.S at 253-54.
"Id. at 254. In McDonnell Douglas and Burdine, the Court stated that if the employer carries
this burden, the plaintiff may then "prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the legitimate
reasons offered by the [employer] were not its true reasons, but were a pretext for discrimination."
Burdine, 450 U.S at 253 (citing with approval McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S at 804). (See supra note 45).
"Price Waterhouse, 109 S. Ct. at 1779.
100 Id. at 1788.
10 Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254-55.
10 Id. at 257 (quoting Trustees of Keene State College v. Sweeney, 439 U.S. 24 (1979)).
103 Id. at 256.
1 0 Id. at 256-57. (emphasis added).
105 Id.
'" See Comment, Relative Qualifications and the Prima Facie Case in Title VII Litigation, 82
COLUM. L. Rav. 553, 569-70 (1982).
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In Price Waterhouse the plurality adopts the standard the Court had
earlier rejected in Burdine. The plurality required PW to satisfy its burden
by producing "objective evidence" of a sufficient reason for its probable
decision which existed at the time the decision was made. 7 Thus, PW's
articulated reason for refusing to grant Ms. Hopkins partnership (i.e., her
abrasiveness with staff members) was not sufficient to meet the "objec-
tive evidence" standard set forth by the plurality.0 8 Yet, it seems that
Price Waterhouse's offering of proof would have satisfied the "minimal"
Burdine standard.'0 9
2. Confusion for the Lower Courts
The Court granted certiorari in Price Waterhouse to resolve a con-
flict among the courts of appeals and to offer the lower courts some
guidance in this very complex and often-confusing area of the law.'10 Un-
fortunately, the plurality's opinion merely serves to create further con-
fusion. As the dissent notes, "the Court manipulates existing and com-
plex rules for employment discrimination cases in a way certain to result
in confusion."" '
Since the plurality provides no precise guidelines to determine which
cases are "mixed-motive" cases, the lower courts may become confused
in determining when to apply the Price Waterhouse test and when to apply
the Burdine test. Because of the different evidentiary burdens required
by each test, this determination can easily be the most important factor
deciding the outcome of the case.
As an analogy, in equal protection cases, very often the most impor-
tant issue the court faces is whether to apply the rational basis test or
the strict scrutiny test. Generally, because of the polaric differences in
these two tests, this determination ultimately decides the case.
Under the plurality's framework in Price Waterhouse, a similar result
may occur in Title VII cases. Yet, the plurality provides little or no
guidance to the lower courts in determining when to apply Burdine and
when to apply Price Waterhouse. Thus, the lower courts are left to their
own discretion on the most important issue in the case.
Price Waterhouse, 109 S. Ct. at 1791.
108 Id. at 1791-92.
109 See Zimmer, supra note 3, at 48.
1 0 Price Waterhouse, 108 S Ct. 1106 (1988).
... Price Waterhouse, 109 S. Ct. at 1806 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
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The Dissent
The plurality's opinion may be inconsistent with earlier Title VII
cases, and it may also be confusing. However, the dissent's standard ap-
pears to be unrealistic.
The dissent states that earlier decisions of the Court have consistently
stated that the burden of persuasion remains with the plaintiff at all
times.W However, the dissent seems to take this standard one step fur-
ther. The dissent suggests that in order to be successful on her claim,
the Title VII plaintiff must prove that the employer's decision would have
been different if the employer had not discriminated.P1 3 Ms. Hopkins had
failed to meet this standard, because she had not proved that she would
have been granted partnership if Price had not discriminated against
her. 4
In order to meet the dissent's very difficult standard, it appears the
Title VII plaintiff, in effect, must prove that there was no legitimate reason
for the employer's decision. In other words, the plaintiff must seemingly
prove that discrimination was the sole reason for the employer's decision.
Such a standard seems unrealistic, if not impossible, when considering
that Ms. Hopkins probably presented more evidence than the average
Title VII plaintiff.!5
Admittedly, Ms. Hopkins had effectively proved that Price Waterhouse
allowed sexual stereotyping to play an important role in its decision-
making process.!"s However, under the dissent's suggested standard, this
offering was not sufficient to prove that discrimination caused Price
Waterhouse's decision. 7 Yet, realistically, as Justice O'Connor notes, "Ann
Hopkins had taken her proof as far as it could go. [It is as if]... she was
told by one of those privy to the decision-making process that her gender
was a major reason" for PW's decision.!" The dissent would have Ms.
Hopkins prove much more. More proof than this does not appear possible.
"' Id. at 1809 (citing Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S 248). The dissent's
philosophy proved convincing in the Court's recent decision in Wards Cove Packing Ca u Atonia
In Atonio, the Court held that the burden of persuasion remains with the plaintiff in disparate im-
pact, as well as disparate treatment cases. (See supra note 41, infra note 143).
Price Waterhouse, 109 & Ct. at 1814.
114 Id.
115 Cf Burdine, 450 U.S 248; McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S 792.
... Price Waterhouse, 109 S Ct. at 1802 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
117 Id. at 1814 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
... Id. at 1802 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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Justice O'Connor's Concurrence
Of the four opinions submitted in Price Waterhouse, Justice O'Con-
nor's concurring opinion appears to formulate the most realistic eviden-
tiary framework. Also, although it provides a different test than McDon-
nell Douglas and Burdine for Title VII cases, its test supplements the
test announced in those cases.
Justice O'Connor suggests adherence to the Court's earlier decisions
in Burdine and McDonnell Douglas. However, she further suggests that
cases like Price Waterhouse are distinguishable from those cases, and thus,
require a different standard. 9
For Justice O'Connor, the primary distinguishing characteristic in
Title VII cases is the type of proof the plaintiff offers. 20 If the plaintiff
offers circumstantial evidence, she falls under the McDonnell Douglas-
Burdine framework; if the plaintiff offers direct evidence, she falls under
the Price Waterhouse framework.' 21"
The test Justice O'Connor suggests in Price Waterhouse is different
from Burdine in that, under the Burdine test, the burden of persuasion
at all times remains with the plaintiff 22 Under Price Waterhouse, once
a plaintiff has presented direct evidence of discrimination (eg., statements
from partners which impacted the decision), the burden of persuasion
shifts to the employer.P3
The test has the following elements. First, the plaintiff must establish
the McDonnell Douglas prima facie case! 24 Additionally, the plaintiff
should produce any direct evidence of discriminatory animus in the
decision-making process.!2 The employer then presents all of its evidence
as to legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for its decision! 26 Once all
n1 Id. at 1796-97.
120 Id. at 1801-02.
" Id Price Waterhouse marked the first time the Court was faced with "direct evidence" of
discrimination. The Ninth Circuit had previously decided a case involving direct evidence. Slack
v. Havens, 522 F.2d 1091 (9th Cir. 1975). In Slack, black plaintiffs presented direct evidence of
discriminatory animus in the form of statements made by employer's agents: "Colored people should
stay in their places' and "Colored folks are hired to clean because they clean better" Id. at 1092-93.
The Ninth Circuit held that the trial court reasonably found discrimination in the terms and condi-
tions of employment as applied to the black plaintiffs. Id at 1095.
122 Price Waterhouse, 109 S. Ct. at 1801.
118 Id. at 1795.
U Id. at 1805 (O'Connor, J., concurring). In order to establish a prima facie case, McDonnell
Douglas required the plaintiff to prove: 1) that he belonged to a minority, 2) that he was qualified
for the job offered, 3) that despite his qualifications, he was rejected, and 4) after rejection, the employer
continued to seek applicants. 411 US. at 802.
125 Price Waterhouse, 109 S. Ct. at 1805 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
2 Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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the evidence is received, the court decides whether to apply the McDon-
nell Douglas-Burdine test or the Price Waterhouse test. 2 If the plaintiff
does not meet the "Price Waterhouse threshold," the court should apply
the McDonnell Douglas-Burdine test, and the plaintiff bears the burden
of persuasion throughout the trial'
s
The test seems workable and realistic, yet it does have one major flaw.
As pointed-out by the dissent, such a test would be difficult to practical-
ly apply because it requires courts to "make the often subtle and difficult
distinction between 'direct' and. . . 'circumstantial' evidence"1 29 Never-
theless, of the different tests suggested, Justice O'Connor's appears to
be the most realistic and it seems consistent with earlier Title VII cases,
representing a logical supplement to those cases.
THE FUTURE
In the near future, we can expect the inevitable retirement of Justices
Brennan and Marshall. With the current republican administration, this
means that there will be at least two more conservative appointments
to an already conservative Court.
As such, we can expect changes in highly controversial areas of the
law: abortion rights,3 Thirteenth Amendment-private contract rights,
and Fourteenth Amendment rights. We can also expect to see changes
in the Title VII area.
Specifically, we can expect to see the dissenting opinion's standard
soon become the majority. That is, the courts of appeals were already in
"disarray" as to the issue addressed in Price Waterhouse. Because the
plurality's opinion does not offer much guidance to the lower courts, we
can expect additional confusion. This will require further elaboration by
the Supreme Court in this area, and it will provide the conservative Court
an opportunity to express a standard of review similar to that expressed
by the dissent.
17 Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
I Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
1 29 Id. at 1812 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
11 The Court has already taken steps to curtail a woman's right to abort an unwanted pregnan-
cy with its recent decision in Webster v. Reproductive Health Serv., 109 S Ct. 3040 (1989). Although
Webster does not overrule Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S 113 (1973), Webster certainly makes it easier for
states to regulate abortions not necessary to save the mother's life Specifically, in Webster, the Court
upheld the validity of Missouri statutes which provide, among other things, that it is unlawful to
use public funds, employees, or facilities to encourage or counsel a woman to have an abortion not
necessary to save her life. Webster, 109 S Ct. at 3040; Mo. REv. STAT. §§ 188.205, 188.210, 188.215.
The Court reasoned that the Due Process Clause generally confers no right to governmental aid.
Webster, slip 109 S Ct. at 3042. Thus, the statutes were valid, and they did not conflict with any
earlier court abortion decisions. Id. In the future, we can undoubtedly expect further restrictions
upon a woman's abortion rights, as the Court comes closer and closer to overruling Roe u Wade
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CONCLUSION
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 is utilized as a tool to pre-
vent employment discrimination. However, the courts of appeals were in
conflict as to the respective burdens of proof of the parties in Title VII
cases. 1
In an effort to resolve this conflict, the United States Supreme Court
granted certiorari in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins. 32 The Court could not
reach a majority opinion in Price Waterhouse; Justice Brennan announced
the plurality opinion and judgment of the Court. 33
Under the plurality's framework, when a Title VII plaintiff proves
that gender played a motivating part in an employment decision, the
employer may avoid liability only by proving by a preponderance of the
evidence that its decision would have been the same absent the discrimina-
tion.lu The plurality's opinion in Price Waterhouse seems inconsistent
with the Court's earlier Title VII cases, McDonnell Douglas and Bur-
dine, in that under Price Waterhouse, the employer must present "objec-
tive evidence" as to its decision.135 Additionally, the plurality's opinion
seems to further confuse an already complicated area of the law.
Conversely, the dissent's suggested standard seems unrealistic Under
the dissent's standard, the Title VII plaintiff must show that the
employer's decision would have been different if the employer had not
discriminated.'36 This standard seems to place an insurmountable burden
upon the plaintiff.
Justice O'Connor's approach seems to be the most practical, and it
appears consistent with earlier Title VII decisions by the Court. Justice
O'Connor distinguishes Price Waterhouse from earlier cases in that Ms.
Hopkins offered direct evidence of discriminationI37 As a result, Justice
O'Connor suggests that when a plaintiff presents direct evidence of
discrimination, the burden of persuasion should shift to the employer to
prove that the employment decision would have been the same, absent
the discrimination. 8
:" Price Waterhouse, 109 S Ct. at 1784 n.2.
1n 108 S. Ct. 1106 (1988).
's' Price Waterhouse, 109 S Ct. at 1780.
1 Id. at 1795.
1 Id. at 1791.
1 Id. at 1814 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1802 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
"' Id. at 1796.
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In the end, the Court reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals,
because the Court of Appeals required Price Waterhouse to prove its af-
firmative defense by clear and convincing evidence 39 The Court remand-
ed, instructing the Court of Appeals to determine if Price Waterhouse
had proved its defense by a preponderance of the evidence"4
In the future, we can expect a more conservative Court. As such, we
can expect the dissenting opinion to, at some point, become the majority.
Temporarily, minorities can celebrate a small victory. Under the cur-
rent scenario, a Title VII plaintiff need only show that discrimination
was a "motivating part" in the employment decision!4' It is then up to
the employer to disprove the discriminatory animus 42 However, in the
future, we can expect to see a significant change; the Title VII plaintiff
will probably be required to prove her case under the dissent's rigid stan-
dard. As a result, future Title VII plaintiffs may be hard-pressed to win
discrimination suits"43
GREGORY T. Rossi
', Id. at 1795.
140 Id.
141 Id.
142 Id.
14 This trend has already begun to develop as evidenced by the Court's decision in Wards Cove
Packing Co. v. Atonio, 109 S. Ct. 2115. In the case, Justice White wrote the majority opinion for
the Court, in which he was joined by the "conservative members" - Chief Justice Rehnquist and
Justices O'Connor, Scalia, and Kennedy. In Atonio, the Court turned its back on precedent and con-
cluded that in disparate impact, like disparate treatment cases, the burden of persuasion does not
shift to the employer when a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case. Thus, what used to be a haven
of victory for plaintiffs was closed down by the conservative court.
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